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Criminal Responsibility for
Non-State Civilian Superiors Lacking
De Jure Authority: A Comparative
Review of the Doctrine of Superior
Responsibility and Parallel Doctrines
in National Criminal Laws
By AVI SINGH*
"Expediency is, as it were, the mother of what is just and fair ..
- Carnaedus
I. Introduction
Conflicts are increasingly neither international nor domestic, and
between parties that may or may not be state parties, leading to new
challenges in international law, as in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, and
more recently in Afghanistan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the ongoing
crises in Somalia. These post-modern conflicts, often involving jus
cogens2 violations by actors that defy traditional categorization, have
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2005.
1. Hugo Grotius, Prolegomena, in INTERNATIONAL RULES: APPROACHES FROM
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 42 (Robert J. Beck et al. eds.,
1996).
2. See EDWARD M. WISE & ELLEN S. PODGOR, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 504 (2000), citing Article 53 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (May 23, 1969) which states jus cogens to be a:
[p]eremptory norm of general international law . .. accepted and recognized
by the international community as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent
norm of general international law having the same character.
While what constitutes jus cogens is often contentious, it is generally presumed that
jus cogens prohibits "genocide, slave trade and slavery, apartheid and other gross
violations of human rights, and perhaps attacks on diplomats" and torture. It should
be noted that this treaty is not universally signed or ratified.
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challenged judicial responses as tribunals grapple with the culpability
of those responsible, the armchair criminals3 - civilian superiors acting
within quasi-political, quasi-military, amorphous organizations.
Perhaps to avoid the anomaly of immunity for jus cogens violators'
acting without de jure authority, there has been a hesitant and
contentious extension of traditional command responsibility doctrine,
now referred to as the superior responsibility doctrine, to civilians
without any de jure authority, often acting in organizations without
any de jure structure. Superior responsibility is believed to effectuate
the judicial goals of deterrence and accountability, placing blame
where is may make the most difference - on the superior.4
In this note, the evolution of civilian superior responsibility is
analyzed, with particular emphasis on non-governmental actors
lacking de jure authority, and possible models in national criminal
codes suggested, outside of military superior responsibility, for
finding civilian superiors of non-government organizations culpable
for jus cogens violations. It is suggested that the military command
responsibility genealogy of civilian superior responsibility, while
important, should neither limit its evolution nor be a straightjacket
for superior responsibility. National solutions to problems such as
organized crimes and terrorism, involving groups that often parallel
non-governmental groups perpetrating jus cogens violations, offer
creative models for superior responsibility that may have been
overlooked. This note, however, does not seek to restrict or narrow
the doctrine of non-de jure superior responsibility, but only to suggest
alternative, and perhaps more solid foundations than military
command responsibility.
3. Judge Navanethem Pillay, The Rule of Law and the Role of the Individual in
the Pursuit of Human Rights, Address at the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung 2003 Human
Rights Award Ceremony for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (May
20, 2003).
4. In many contemporary conflicts, there may be only de facto, self-proclaimed
governments, and de facto armies and paramilitary groups subordinate to them. To
enforce the law in these circumstances requires a determination of accountability not
only of individual offenders but of their commanders or their superiors who were,
based on evidence, in control of them without, however, a formal commission or
appointment. A tribunal could find itself powerless to enforce humanitarian laws
against de facto superiors if it only accepted as proof of command authority a formal
letter of authority. See Prosecutor v. Delalic et al (" ELEBI I"), Case No. IT-96-21-
A, Appeals Chamber Judgement, (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, Feb. 20, 2001), available at
<www.un.org/icty/celebici/appeal/judgement2/index.html>.
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II. Traditional Superior Responsibility
Superior responsibility, a doctrine initially limited to military
commanders with de jure authority is well established in international
law,5 with codifications and applications. A military commander can
be held criminally, and at least domestically in the United States,
civilly liable, for jus cogens violations committed by his or her
subordinates.6 Superior responsibility is both a crime of omission,
even of negligence, and a crime considered grievous7 - on one hand
holding a military commander culpable, without any aiding or
abetting of a subordinate's commission of criminal acts, and on the
other hand requiring the subordinates crimes to be serious jus cogens
violations, such as war crimes. It is supplemental to individual
criminal responsibility, such as a superior ordering a subordinate to
commit a jus cogens violation.'
There are generally three elements of superior responsibility.
First, the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship with the
perpetrator of the substantive crime. 9 Second, a mens rea element
that requires knowledge, often constructive, suggesting a negligence
standard, of the subordinate's jus cogens violations ° Last, an actus
reus element that requires that the superior either failed to prevent
the abuses, or post-hoc, failed to punish the subordinate perpetrators
for their actions."
Command responsibility has historical roots. Grotius'
application of "distinction and proportionality" to the laws of war,
developed in 1625, in seeking to constrain the waging of war, is
recognized as the fist step towards the formation of a military
5. "[C]ustomary international law is analogous to common law in the Anglo-
American tradition... [it] develops without formal codification." Anthony Clark
Arend, Toward an Understanding of International Legal Rules, in INTERNATIONAL
RULES, supra note 1, at 297.
6. L.C. Green, Command Responsibility in International Humanitarian Law, 5
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 319 (1995).
7. Kai Ambos, Superior Responsibility, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY (Antonio Cassese et al. eds.,
2002)
8. See Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgement and
Sentence (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Dec. 6, 1999), Points 33 - 43,
available at <http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Rutaganda/judgement/index.htm>.
9. See generally Ilias Bantekas, The Contemporary Law of Superior
Responsibility, 93 AM. J. INT'LL. 573,577 (1999).
10. Id.
11. Id.
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command responsibility doctrine. Another commentator has traced
the first codification of command responsibility to Charles VII of
Orleans' Ordinance.13  Francis Lieber's Code continued the
development of Grotius' doctrine on the laws of war, prompting its
adoption by the 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg.'4  The 1874
Brussels Conference declaration, and the 1899 and 1904 Hague
Conventions, furthered the development of laws of war. After World
War I, the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of War
and on Enforcement of Penalties recommended, without success, a
tribunal to try military commanders who had knowledge of, but failed
to prevent violations."
Military commanders execute wars, and the necessity of military
command responsibility in also effectuating the laws of war was first
established by the jurisprudence of the post-World War II tribunals.
In a seminal case, In re Yamashita, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a
U.S. Military tribunal's death sentence for Admiral Yamashita, the
wartime commander of Japanese troops in the Philippines, for a strict
"personal responsibility for his failure to take [appropriate measures
as are reasonable in his powers to control the troops under his
command for the prevention of the jus cogens violations by his
troops] . . . when violations result.. ,16 Admiral Yamashita was
held to have failed his "affirmative duty to take . . . measures ...
within his power and appropriate in the circumstances .... 17  The
court applied a strict liability test, holding mere de jure authority to
be sufficient, and rejecting Yamashita's defense that he lacked the
ability to prevent or punish jus cogens violations - war crimes - by
12. Nicole Barrett, Holding Individual Leaders Responsible for Violations of
Customary International Law: The U.S. Bombardment of Cambodia and Laos, 32
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 429,445 (2001).
13. "The King orders that each captain or lieutenant be held responsible for the
abuses, ills and offenses committed by members of his company .... ." JOHN R. W. D.
JONES & STEVEN POWLES, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PRACrICE 425 (3d ed., Oxford
University Press, 2003) (1998) (citing Charles VII's "Ordinance des Rois de France de
la Troisieme Race" noted in THEODER MERON, HENRY'S LAWS AND SHAKESPEARE'S
WARS (1993)).
14. The declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868 stated that the "only legitimate
objects which states should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the
military forces of the enemy." See Barrett, supra note 12, at 445.
15. JOHN R.W.D. JONES & STEVEN POWLES, supra note 13, at 425 (quoting
Commission Report, Mar. 19, 1919,14 AM. J. INT'L L. 25 (1920)).
16. Ambos, supra note 7, at 826 (quoting In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 15 (1946)).
17. Matthew Lippman, Humanitarian Law: The Uncertain Contours of Command
Responsibility, 9 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 12 (2001).
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Japanese troops, the actus reus element, because the U.S. campaign
had disrupted his communication with his subordinates."8 Yamashita's
standard - a strict liability standard, inferred from de jure authority -
has rarely since been applied. This standard and the conduct of the
trial proceedings have been criticized'9 for "ideological-racial
prejudice."2°  The Yamashita standards' shortcoming have been
described as sufficient "to make a lawyer wish to forget all about
them at the earliest possible moment.,
2
'
The Nuremberg trials of German Nazi officials and military
officers applied superior responsibility with a mens rea requirement
of knowledge of the subordinates' actions. In U.S. v. Pohl, the
Tribunal held military commanders to have an "affirmative duty."
22
However, the case against the German "High Command" established
a higher standard for culpability than Yamashita.23 The Tokyo
Tribunal also found military, and even government civilian leaders, to
possess constructive knowledge of mistreatment of prisoners of war,
and criminally liable for their inaction.4
The post-My Lai25 trials of U.S. field military commanders reflect
the variance of standards based on extra-judicial factors. Captain
Ernest Medina, the field commander, was acquitted for lacking
18. See generally In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 1.
19. The Trial itself was marked by serious procedural flaws that violated Admiral
Yamashita's right to a fair trial. For example, the Tribunal had no lawyers among the
judges, and little regard to the rules of evidence, at one point admitting into evidence
a mock fictional documentary detailing secret orders to destroy Manila. Mirjan
Damaska, The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 455, 496
n.61 (2001); Belinda Cooper, A Cold War Conflict of Interest, in WAR CRIMES: THE
LEGACY OF NUREMBERG (Belinda Cooper ed., 1999), 69.
20. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 28 (J. Murphy, dissenting) ("This indictment
in effect permitted the military commission to make the crime whatever it willed,
dependent upon its biased view as to petitioner's duties .... "); See also Ambos, supra
note 7, at 827.
21. Damaska, supra note 19, at 487 (quoting Scharzenberger, The Problems of
International Criminal Law, 3 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 30 (1950)).
22. Ambos, supra note 7, at 829 (quoting U.S. v. Pohl et al., (Case 4), VTWC,
958 - 1163, at 1101).
23. See generally U.S. v. Wilhelm von Leeb, United Nations War Crimes
Commission, XII LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1 (1948).
24. Though there is little data, it may be that the evidence in Nuremberg, given
Nazi Germany meticulous record-keeping, and pathology of formal laws, made it
possible to apply a higher mens rea standard. This paper returns to the theme of
practicability later.
25. My-Lai is the common term used to describe a particular incident of war
crimes by U.S. troops during the U.S.-Vietnam war.
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"positive [or actual]26 knowledge" of his subordinate's war crimes - jus
cogens violations.27 Although "political," ' and contrary to U.S. army
regulations, Captain Medina's case is illustrative of the inconsistency
in upholding an affirmative mens rea standard to even de jure military
hierarchies.
In contrast, other jurisprudence in the military context,
sometimes from unlikely sources, has extended the subordinate-
superior relationship to include de facto control. The Kahan Report
on the Phalangist militia's massacre in Sabra and Shatila Palestinian
refugee camps in Beirut when it was under Israeli military control,
though only an advisory opinion, held then Defense Minister Ariel
Sharon a responsible superior even for "troops outside... [his] chain
of command over whom decision-makers exercised effective informal
control., 29 As Defense Minister, he was not a military commander,
and his de jure authority was attenuated, but the Kahan Report
considered his involvement in the Sabra incidents was akin to de facto
effective control. Such jurisprudence has had significant impact on
subsequent jurisprudence on finding civilian superiors, within and
outside hierarchical organizations, liable for subordinates' jus cogens
violations. °
HI. Extending Superior Responsibility to Civilians
Command responsibility, established in customary international
law through post World War II jurisprudence, was only codified" in
the 1977 Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention, applicable
to international armed conflicts, in Article 86 (2):
The fact that a breach of the Convention or this Protocol was
committed by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from
penal or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if they
knew, or had information which should have enabled them to
conclude in the circumstances at the time, that he was committing
26. Ambos, supra note 7, at 832.
27. Lippman, supra note 17, at 38.
28. Id. at 44.
29. Id. at 46, 51.
30. See generally Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14 (International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 1998), available at
<http://www.un.org/icty/cases/indictindex-e.htm>.
31. It should be noted that not all countries are signatories to Additional
Protocol I, with 150 countries having ratified the convention. Ambos, supra note 7, at
841.
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or was going to commit such a breach and if they did not take all
feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the
breach.32
Article 87 further specified the duty of military commanders.33
However, Protocol I's Article 86 (2) language on superior
responsibility did not limit its application to military superiors,
referring only to "superiors."'  For both military and civilian
superiors,35 it articulated a mens rea requirement of specific
knowledge, actual or constructive, of a subordinates' jus cogens
violations for command culpability. In doing so, for the mens rea
requirement, it formulated culpability for negligence. It did,
however, set forth an explicit duty as a "guarantor" for military
commanders. 6 Also, the Protocol was silent on the nature of superior
responsibility, and for at least one commentator, "[t]he more specific
determination of this responsibility - penal or disciplinary, primary or
vicarious - was left to the domestic law of the ratifying states."37 The
1977 Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Convention, applicable to
internal armed conflicts, however, did not contain any provision on
command or superior responsibility.
The 1996 Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security
32. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
June 8, 1977, art. 86(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977), available at
<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/93.htm>. [hereinafter Protocol I.
33. Id. at art. 87.
34. Timothy Wu & Yong-Sung (Jonathan) Kang, Criminal Liability for the
Actions of Subordinates--The Doctrine of Command Responsibility and its Analogues
in United States Law, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 272, 291 (1997).
35. The ICRC Commentary includes military commanders within the ambit of
Article 86 "superior" and stipulates superior to be person with "personal
responsibility with regard to the perpetrator of the acts concerned because the latter,
being his subordinate, is under his control." International Committee of the Red
Cross, Commentary to Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I) - Part V: Execution of the conventions and of this protocol #Section II -
Repression of breaches of the conventions and of this protocol, Point 3544, available
at <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf>.
36. Ambos, supra note 7, at 838.
37. Damaska, supra note 19, at 486 (quoting Bassiouni, Repression of the
Breaches of the Geneva Convention, 8 RUTGERS-CAM. L.J. 185, 205 (1977)).
38. Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Appeals Chamber,
Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command
Responsibility (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 2003),
Points 30-31, available at <http://www.un.org/icty/cases/indictindex-e.htm>.
2005]
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of Mankind incorporates Protocol I's superior responsibility doctrine,
stating:
The fact that a crime against the peace and security of mankind was
committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superiors of
criminal responsibility, if they knew or had reason to know, in the
circumstances at the time, that the subordinate was committing or
was going to commit such a crime and if they did not take all
necessary measures within their power to prevent or repress the
crime.39
The Draft Code, like Protocol I, does not explicitly limit superior
responsibility to military commanders, and does not distinguish
between civilian and military superiors in its plain language.
Similarly, the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish
Torture extends superior responsibility to "[a] public servant or
employee who acting in that capacity orders, instigates or induces the
use of torture, or directly commits it or who, being able to prevent it,
fails to do so. ,40
The Security Council resolutions that codify the substantive and
procedural laws of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
("ICTY") and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
("ICTR"), enacted before the Draft Code, are identical on the issue
of superior responsibility, and consistent with Protocol I. The ICTY
statute, for instance, states that:
[t]he fact that any of [the crimes].., were committed by a
subordinate does not relieve his superior of command responsibility
if he knew or should have known that the subordinate was about to
commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to prevent
such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof."
39. Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp.
No. 10, art. 12, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991), available at
<http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/dcode.htm>.
40. Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, Article 3 (Dec. 9,
1998), available at <http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/Treaties/a-51.html>
(emphasis added).
41. Art. 7(3), Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia ("ICTY"), S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc.
SIRES/827 (1993), amended S.C. Res. 1411. See also identical Art. 6(3), Statute of
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"), S.C. Res. 955, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/955 (1994), available at
<www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/Resolutions/955e.htm> ("[T]he fact that any of the acts
referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute was committed by a subordinate
does not relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had
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The ICTY and ICTR Statute's thus, as articulated in the
Secretary General's Report, set forth an "imputed responsibility or
criminal negligence, ' 2 that the U.S. delegation to the Security
Council considered applicable to both military and civilian leaders.43
However, the Commission of Experts for the ICTY in their final
report, considered Article 7 (3) to be "[d]irected primarily at military
commander[s.]""
The ICTR Statute extends the application of superior
responsibility, not codified in Protocol 1I, to Rwanda45 - an internal
armed conflict. It is in the Yugoslavia context, however, that the
applicability of command responsibility to an internal command
responsibility was challenged. Although the conflict in Yugoslavia
has been ruled international in conflict, the Indictment in Prosecutor
v. Hadzihasanovic only pleaded an unclassified armed conflict. The
Appeals Chamber held that command responsibility was part of
international customary law, and its omission from Protocol II did not
render it inapplicable in an internal armed conflict. 6
Consistent with Protocol I, the ICTR and ICTY statutes do not
distinguish between military and civilian superiors in their plain
language. As Security Council resolutions binding on all states based
on Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations, 7 albeit with
limited jurisdiction, the statutes are universal customary international
law, though the tribunals can and have ruled on their competency and
jurisdiction as empowered by the Council, as opposed to the Rome
Statute of the ICC, which is not universally ratified. Also, superior
culpability can be applied concurrent to direct culpability, increasing
the culpability of superiors .4  The Statute's were intended to hold
reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so
and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent
such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.")
42. JONES & POWLES, supra note 13, at 430.
43. Id. at 431, (citing U.N. Doc. S/PV 3217 (1993)).
44. Id. at 431.
45. After protracted legal arguments, the conflict in Yugoslavia has classified as
international. See Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14 (International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 1998), available at
<http://www.un.org/icty/cases/indictindex-e.htm>, at 110.
46. Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Appeals Chamber,
Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command
Responsibility (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 2003),
available at <http://www.un.org/icty/cases/indictindex-e.htm>, at 31-32.
47. Damaska, supra note 19.
48. See Kirsten M.F. Keith, The Mens Rea of Superior Responsibility as
20051
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accountable culpable superiors in conflicts without precedence, as
reflected in the Final Report of the Committee of Experts on
Yugoslavia, where the mens rea for superior responsibility established
culpability so long as it if fair and sufficient to establish
responsibility. 9
The Rome Statute'O establishing the International Criminal
Court (ICC) explicitly recognizes the extension of superior
responsibility to civilian leaders, de jure and de facto. Article 28 of
the Rome Statute provides:
1. A military commander or person effectively acting as a military
commander shall be held criminally responsible for crimes within
the jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his or her
effective command and control, or effective authority and control
as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise
control properly over such forces, where ....
2. With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not
described in paragraph 1, a superior will be criminally responsible
for crimes within the jurisdiction of this Court committed by
subordinates under his or her effective authority and control, as a
result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such
subordinates, where:
(a) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded
information which clearly indicated, that the subordinates were
committing or were about to commit such crimes; " (Italics added.)
In its plain language, the Rome Statute thus sets forth a more
flexible threshold for military commanders and civilian leaders with
de jure authority, such as police and executive leaders, and a separate,
higher threshold, with a more stringent mens rea requirement, for
civilians without de jure authority, such as political leaders. While de
facto superior authority is recognized for both leaders, military
superiors must exercise effective "command and control" while
Developed by ICTY Jurisprudence, 14 L.J.I.L 617 (2001).
49. Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to S.C. Res.
80 (1992), U.N. SCOR, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (May 27, 1992).
50. An international treaty, the Rome Statute establishing the International
Criminal Court (ICC) is limited in its valuable contribution to customary
international law as it is not ratified by, inter alia, the United States, China, and India.
51. The Rome Statute for an International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 53d
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, art. 28 (date), reprinted in WISE AND PODGOR,
supra note 2, at 613.
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civilian leaders must exercise effective "authority and control. 5 2
Thus, Article 28 (1) includes civilian leaders who are "de facto part of
the chain of military command"53[emphasis added] with the
accompanying duty of control. Article 28 (2), in contrast, extends
command responsibility to "superior-subordinate relations within
nonmilitary organizations, such as the links between a Minister of
Interior and policemen or between a factory manager and
employees."5  The Rome Statute also established a causal
requirement, not established in the ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence,
where the harm must be a "result of failure to... exercise proper
control[.]"55 In addition, the superior must exercise "necessary and
reasonable" control to "prevent or repress the commission of [jus
cogens violations]. 56  As such, the Rome Statute recognizes the
experience of the ICTY and ICTR in applying the superior
responsibility doctrine to civilian superiors without de jure authority
over combatants,57 and the resulting inconsistencies in the tribunals'
superior responsibility jurisprudence.
Post World War II tribunals had reluctantly extended superior
responsibility to civilian government leaders, albeit under much
criticism. 8 In what one scholars calls an "unprecedented" extension,
Wilhelm Frick, Nazi Germany's Minister of Interior, who was "well
aware" of the policy of euthanasia practiced by health facilities under
his control, was convicted as he "nevertheless disregarded popular
protests and the killings continued" resulting in 250,000 deaths.59
Similarly, in the Tokyo Tribunals, Japanese Foreign Minister
Shigemitsu was convicted for not resigning from his nominal
command when unable to exercise proper control over the conduct of
52. Ambos supra note 7, at 849-50.
53. Yuval Shany & Keren R. Michaeli, The Case Against Ariel Sharon: Revisiting
the Doctrine of Command Responsibility, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 797, 850
(2002).
54. Id.
55. Ambos supra note 7, at 849-50.
56. Id.
57. See Prosecutor v. Delalic et al (" ELEBI I"), Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals
Chamber Judgement, (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Feb. 20, 2001), available at
<www.un.org/icty/celebici/appeal/judgement2/index.html>.
58. Id. at 262 (J, R ling, dissenting, in the trial of Foreign Minister Hirota argued
that superior responsibility should be limited to military superiors).
59. Lippman, supra note 17, at 15.
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Japanese troops.6° In the trial of Foreign Minister Koki Hirota for
superior responsibility for the Japanese troops' mass murders in
Nanking, China, he was charged with knowledge of the atrocities and
acceptance of military assurances, and convicted for "criminal
negligence,"'" although he exercised only "influence rather than
formal authority over the military."6 2  In the "Roechling Case,"
perhaps because the accused was related to Marshal Goehring, the
Nuremberg U.S. Military Tribunal extended superior responsibility
for a non-governmental civilian leader, an industrialist, for ill
treatment of deportees employed as forced labor because he
"permitted it[,]... and [did not do] his utmost to put an end to the
abuses."63
A recent U.S. case, although applying superior responsibility in a
civil liability case, illustrates the acceptance of superior culpability for
civilians with de jure authority, particularly executive control of
military forces. In Hilao v. Estate of Marcos ("Marcos II"), in which
the former President of Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos, was the
defendant in a civil suit pleading tortuous conduct, the court applied
superior responsibility explicitly, ruling that the "conduct at issue ...
involved violations by members of military or paramilitary forces of a
jus cogens norm of international law parallel to the types of war
crimes for which international law imposes command
responsibility."'
The ICTY and ICTR ad-hoc tribunals, as mentioned above,
confronting post-modern conflicts, have been particularly active in
extending command responsibility to de jure and de facto civilian
superiors. In Prosecutor v. Delalic et al (" elebi i case"), the ICTY
Trial Chamber extended superior responsibility to civilians with de
facto authority, "analogous to military commanders... with
substantially similar powers of control over subordinates[,]" at a
Bosnian Muslim-Croat Federation run prison camp housing Bosnian
60. 20 Tokyo War Crimes Trial 49 at 831 (1981).
61. Ambos supra note 7, at 849-50 (citing 1 THE TOKYO JUDGMENT: THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST (IMTFE) 446 (B.V.A.
R ling & C.F. R tter eds., 1977)).
62. Lippman, supra note 17, at 23; see also Prosecutor v. Delalic et al
(" ELEBI I"), Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Chamber Judgement, (International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Feb. 20, 2001), available at
<www.un.org/icty/celebici/appeal/judgement2/index.html>, at 261 ("language
indicating powers of persuasion rather than formal authority...
63. elebi i, at 262.
64. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (Marcos II), 103 F.3d 767, 778 (9th Cir. 1996).
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Serbs, absent any de jure authority.6 The ICTY Appeals Chamber
seemingly did not distinguish between a de facto and de jure superior,
so long as the superior has the "power or authority.., to prevent a
subordinate's crime or to punish the perpetrator of the crime .... "66
The Appeals Chamber acknowledged that "...customary law...
does not define precisely the means by which the [effective] control
must be exercised."'67 Applying this case-specific standard, the Trial
Chamber convicted Zdravko Mucic, commander of the prison camp,
for dereliction of his duty to ensure the proper treatment of prisoners
at his camp, the commission of heinous offenses by subordinates, and
the failure to initiate disciplinary action. The Trial Chamber was
explicit that no "formal appointment" as a superior was necessary.68
Confusingly however, the elebi i court, applying a de facto
standard, acquitted Zejnil Delalic, a local tactical commander, of
superior responsibility for the prison camp, though he exercised
substantial influence on the guards, as he was not directly in
command. 69 The decision reflects the tension in extending superior
responsibility to "decentralized and diffused military authorities"
with an "effective control" standard.7' For the Appeals Chamber,
even "substantial influence" would have been sufficient if it was a
"material abilit[y] to prevent subordinate offenses or punish
subordinate offenders.
71
The ad-hoc tribunals extension of superior responsibility to
civilians, reflecting its military genealogy, and case-specific
application, is inconsistent. In another instance, Dario Kordic, Vice
President of the self-styled Bosnian Croat "Republic," despite his
"tremendous influence and power" over Croat armed forces, though
convicted under Article 7 (1) for direct responsibility, was acquitted
for superior responsibility under Article 7 (3) as the Trial Chamber,
though ostensibly applying an effective control test (de facto), used a
de jure standard.72 The Chamber explicitly stated "that great care
65. Prosecutor v. Delalic (" elebi i Case"), Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber
Judgment (April 8, 2003) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 1998), available at <www.un.org/icty>, 143, 378.
66. elebi i, Appeal Chamber Judgment, at 192.
67. Id. at 266.
68. elebi i Trial Chamber Judgment, at 735.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 370.
71. elebi i, Appeal Chamber Judgment, at 266.
72. Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Trial Chamber Judgment (Feb.
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must be taken in assessing the evidence to determine command
responsibility in respect to civilians, lest an injustice be done."73 The
case is indicative of the limitations of superior responsibility for
civilians, even those conceivably acting like military commanders.
The importance, however, of the superior responsibility doctrine
to civilians is illustrated by the fact that the only persons convicted of
superior responsibility for genocide, to date, have been civilians. The
ICTR jurisprudence, in particular, faced with trials of individuals
acting outside the parameters of the formal state, has had to deal
extensively with the superior culpability of civilians often lacking de
jure authority, and has been less cautious in finding culpability for
civilian superiors. In its first case, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, the
defendant Jean-Paul Akayesu was a bourgmestre (mayor) of Taba
commune, a teacher, and a school inspector.74 The case applied the
case-specific standard to determine Akayesu's de facto "power to
take all necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
commission of the alleged crimes or to punish the perpetrators
thereof.""5 The Trial Chamber held that Akayesu not only had had de
jure authority over the commune and its police, but also de facto
authority as the "most powerful figures of the commune[.] 7 6
Applying this standard, apparently inconsistent with the one applied
by the ICTY in elebi i for Delalic, Akayesu was found culpable
under superior responsibility, even for the actions of the
Interahamwe," the political militia associated with the ruling party of
26, 2001) (840-41 (Int'l Crim. Trib for the Former Yugoslavia 1998), available at
<www.un.org/icty>.
73. Id.
74. See generally Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber
Judgment (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Sept. 2, 1998), available at
<www.ictr.org/>.
75. Id. at 10.
76. Id. at 61, 63- 64, 77.
77. The Interhamwe were set up as a youth movement of the ruling party,
Mouvement Revolutionnaire Nationale pour le D~veloppement (MRND) in 1992, and
were connected to Hutu Powa (Power), an extreme political movement that gained
increased support in the 1990s in the aftermath of the Tutsi-majority Rwanda
Patriotic Front (RPF) invasion. Its core was the "conviction that Tutsis were an alien
race to Rwanda, and not an indigenous ethnic group." While other political parties
had their own respective militias, they were all referred to as Interahamwe during
1994, when they were transformed from vigilante political groups to a "death squad
whose members led house-to-house search for identifying and killing Tutsis ......
MAHMOOD HAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS: COLONIALISM, NATIVISM,
AND THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 189-90, 209, 212, 216 (2002).
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Rwanda and ascribing to the extreme Hutu Powa (Power) ideology to
which many of the civilian perpetrators of genocide belonged,8
though he had no de jure authority over them. He was, however, not
convicted for the Interahamwe's criminal actions because the
Indictment had failed to plead that a superior-subordinate
relationship existed between Akayesu and the Interahamwe.79
The ICTR convicted, under the superior responsibility doctrine,
in Prosecutor v. Musema, a tea factory owner who was politically
active, for being "present at [the] attack site," with knowledge of his
employees committing the crimes, and failing "to take any measures
to prevent or punish the commission of these crimes." 8 In a broad
extension of the test of effective control, the Trial Chamber stated
that the "influence at issue in a superior-subordinate command
relationship often appears in the form of psychological pressure,"
often from socially and politically prominent persons. 1  Alfred
Musema had de facto control over his employees, was present at the
factory, and failed to discipline, terminate, or withhold resources from
the perpetrators, incurring superior culpability.'
Despite Musema and ICTR jurisprudence's on civilian superiors,
in Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, the ICTR Trial Chamber reverted to
superior responsibility's military genealogy, limiting it to superiors
who "exercise a degree of control over their subordinates which is
similar to that of military commanders.,83 Indeed, the Trial Chamber
referred to the "trappings of de jure authority" instead of effective
78. According to Human Rights Watch, "[t]he Interahamwe was an
unincorporated supposedly independent of the MRND, [the ruling political party,]
but heavily influenced by it." It is believed to have "provided the civilian striking
force of the genocide." Human Rights Watch, Leave None to Tell the Story:
Genocide in Rwanda, March 1999, at <www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Genol-3-
05.htm>.
79. Akayesu, Trial Chambers Judgment, at 691.
80. Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,
57, 880 (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Jan, 27 2000), available at
<www.ictr.org/> (holding that "Musema exercised de jure authority over [tea factory]
employees [and] ... was in a position, by virtue of these powers, to take reasonable
measures, such as removing, or threatening to remove, an individual from his or her
position at the Tea Factory if he or she was identified as a perpetrator of crimes
punishable under the Statute, [thus] ... Musema exercised de jure power and de
facto control over Tea Factory employees and the resources of the Tea Factory").
81. Id. at 140.
82. Id. at 226, 303, 878.
83. Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A-T, Trial Chamber
Judgement, P 42 (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 2001), available at
<www.ictr.org> (emphasis added).
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control in reaching its holdings.8'
The inconsistencies in the jurisprudence are also evident from
Kayashima and Ruzindana, where the ICTR Trial Chamber
postulated a higher threshold of culpability for civilian superiors.85 It
articulated a "knew or should have known" - negligence - standard
for military superiors, and a "knew or consciously disregarded
information which clearly indicated or put him on notice" -
recklessness - standard for civilian superiors.86 The ICTY, however,
usually more cautious in applying superior responsibility to civilian
superiors, in Kronjelac, explicitly applied the same knowledge
requirement for military and civilian superiors." The mens rea
requirement for superior responsibility, thus, remains a contentious
issue in ICTR and ICTY trials.
In Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, the ICTR Trial Chamber reiterated
the three-part test for finding civilian superiors responsible for their
subordinates' jus cogens violations:
(i) There existed a superior subordinate relationship between the
person against whom the charge is directed and the perpetrators of
the offense;
(ii) The superior knew or had reason to know that the criminal act
was about to be or had been committed;
(iii) The superior failed to exercise effective control to prevent the
criminal act or punish the perpetrators thereof.88
The Trial Chamber explicitly reaffirmed superior responsibility
for de facto superiors with "effective control over... subordinates[,]"
inferred from the "material ability.., to prevent or to punish offenses
committed by subordinates."8 9  The mens rea required is
undistinguished between military and civilian superiors - "knew or
had reason to know of [subordinates'] conduct."90  Indeed, the
Chamber explicitly rejected inferring knowledge from de jure
84. Id. at 42-43.
85. JONES & POWLES, supra note 13, at 438.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Prosecutor v. Kajilijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44-A-T, Trial Chamber
Judgement, point 772 (Int'l Crim. Trib for Rwanda, December 1, 2003), available at
<www.ictr.org>.
89. Id. at points 773-74.
90. Id. at point 775.
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authority alone." The Chamber found Juv6nal Kajelijeli, a former
bourgmestre, who was re-appointed to his post during the genocide, to
posses a superior subordinate relationship with the Interahamwe
derived from his instructions to them, his influence, and his inherent
authority as a bourgmestre to prevent the Interahamwe's actions.'
The Chamber held that Kajelijeli "was a leader of Interahamwe with
control over the Interahamwe..., and that he also had influence over
the Interahamwe of [the neighboring] commune .... 9 The Chamber,
thus, found a local official to have both inherent authority over the
Interahamwe, in contrast to Akayesu, as well as being superiorly
responsible on the basis of influence. In doing so, it applied a broad
standard of liability for civilian superiors.
The tribunals' jurisprudence on civilian superior responsibility
remains inconsistent at best, and often bewildering. This shoehorning
of the doctrine of military command responsibility to fit the need to
find de facto civilian superiors culpable invariably leaves the doctrine
with stretch marks that do it and the tribunals' jurisprudence
disservice.
The Rome Statute of the ICC, perhaps mindful of the fog over
the applicable standards for superior responsibility, has recognized
that de jure lapels offer little assistance, and articulated a de facto
determination of imputed liability. The ICC however, has yet to
commence a legal trial, and de facto standards often mirror the factual
circumstance of each case. History offers little cause to hope that it's
civilian superior responsibility jurisprudence will be less inconsistent.
IV. The Extensions (Re) Considered
Superior responsibility is generally considered an exception to
the principles of criminal law, which require direct responsibility. 94
Superior responsibility, however, "relates systematically to the
liability for ordering a crime, [as n]ormally, [it is] accompanied by
orders to commit certain acts; if such orders cannot be proven or
attributed to the [superior], superior responsibility serves as a kind of
91. Id. at point 776 ("A superior in a chain of hierarchical command with
authority over a given geographical area will not be held strictly liable for
subordinates' crimes. While an individual's hierarchical position may be a significant
indicium that he or she knew or had reason to know about subordinates' criminal
acts, knowledge will not be presumed from status alone.").
92. Id. at points 404, 780, 781.
93. Id. at point 404.
94. Shany & Michaeli, supra note 53, at 832.
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subsidiary form of criminal liability." 95  Vicarious criminal liability
also has analogies in domestic laws, one of the primary sources of
customary international law."
Superior responsibility is grounded in the necessity and nature of
conflicts, especially in its extension to civilian de facto superiors. The
need for justice, 9 the grievousness of the jus cogens violations, and
the evidentiary burden particular to superiors, has driven the doctrine
of superior responsibility. According to one delegate to the drafting
of Protocol I:
[olne of the main reasons for including the concept of negligence in
the second paragraph of article [86 (superior responsibility)] was a
practical one. It would often be difficult in practice to prove that a
commander actually knew what was going on, which would deprive
the provision of some of its deterrence effects. It would have been
that a commander should be held responsible for acts which he, as a
commander, should know were taking place. If we were made so
responsible, there would be an inducement for the commander to
ensure that he was at all times kept fully informed and thereby
enabled to prevent breaches. 98
Superior responsibility is a "convenient" 9 mechanism for affixing
responsibility "where it will make a difference."'"
Superior responsibility is also intended to effectuate the goals of
international laws proscribing crimes against peace and humanity that
aim to deter violations, and affirm lawful conduct between arms.
Given a superior's role, superior responsibility both deters and
incentivises"0 superiors, and the "punishment of [superiors] might
95. Ambos supra note 7, at 853-54.
96. Customary international law is "international law that derives from the
practice of states and is accepted by them as legally binding. - This is one of the
principal sources or building blocks of the international legal system." BLACK'S LAW
DIcTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
97. See Judge Louise Arbour, former prosecutor of the ICTY and ICTR, quoted
in BILL BERKELEY, THE GRAVES ARE NOT YET FULL: RACE, TRIBE, AND POWER IN
THE HEART OF AFRICA 251(2001) ("Criminal law kicks in when all other institutions
have failed. This is our last redemption, out last chance to contribute towards some
resolution of these situations. We should not short-change history by failing to show
the magnitude of the criminal organization and the criminal drive .... [This offers] a
measure of justice for the top conspirators, and a coherent narrative of how the
conspiracy was organized.").
98. Keith, supra note 48, at 634.
99. Wu & Kang, supra note 34, at 279-82 n.89.
100. Id. at 290.
101. See Lippman, supra note 17, at 90 (stating that command responsibility
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exceed, in certain circumstances, that of the actual perpetrators of the
offense."'' 2 The application of the doctrine for civilian superiors with
only de facto "effective control" is even more practical and expedient,
given the difficult evidentiary burden outside military and other
hierarchical de jure contexts, even though the threshold for liability is
higher than that for de jure contexts. Given the nature of conflicts,
such as Rwanda and Yugoslavia, and globalized warfare against
terrorist groupings, 3 and civilian superiors without de jure authority,
such as the Interahamwe or Al Qaeda - legal tools to hold them
accountable are necessary. In other words, command responsibility
affixes blame, and a positive duty, "where it will make a difference."
In applying superior responsibility to civilians, while de jure
civilian superiors within military hierarchies fit neatly into the
doctrine of superior responsibility, de facto civilian superiors of
groups such as these continue to represent a challenge.
Superior responsibility is generally considered an exception to
the culpability principles of criminal law, which require an intent
element, and rarely punish negligence."°4 They distinguish between
intentional conduct and negligent omission lacking in criminal intent,
for as Justice Holmes remarked - "even a dog distinguishes between
being stumbled over and being kicked."'0 5  Superior responsibility,
"encourage[s] military and civilian superiors to fulfill their legal duty to control the
conduct of combatants").
102. Shany & Michaeli, supra note 53, at 833.
103. For instance, the current designation of Taliban and AI-Qaeda members by
the United States as "unlawful combatants" forces the question whether they can
only be held liable under a standard of superior responsibility that extends to de facto
civilian leaders. See Federalist Society of Law and Public Policy Studies, They Aren't
POWs, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2002 (contending that Taliban and Al Qaeda are
"unlawful combatants" under the Geneva Convention partly based on their failure to
respect the rules of conflicts"). Also advanced is the opposite, and one may argue,
majority position, that suspects should be accorded the protections of international
law, suggests that Al Qaeda members, for instance, should be held responsible under
international law, even if they are not de jure commanders. See Lewis, Neil A. Judge
Calls Halt to Guantanamo Trial, INT. HERALD TRIB., Nov. 10, 2004 (reporting Judge
James Robertson's reassertion of POW status on detainees pending hearings)
104. See Damaska, supra note 19, at 464. ("A superior who may not even have
condoned the misdeeds of his subordinates [but was negligent] is to be stigmatized in
the same way as the international perpetrators of those misdeeds. As a result of this
dramatic escalation of responsibility, a commander's liability is divorced from his
culpability to such a degree that his conviction no longer mirrors his underlying
conduct and his actual mens rea."). In contrast, municipal criminal law rarely
convicts for such criminal behavior, especially for the most grievous of crimes. [This
is an editorial comment on the previous proposition]
105. Id. at 444 (citing OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 3 (1881)).
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however, has many analogues in domestic laws, one of the primary
sources of international customary law, and even in international
jurisprudence.
When applied to civilian commanders within and outside the
military structure, it is clear that the limited context of the former falls
squarely within the ambit of superior responsibility goals, though it
presents evidentiary and balancing challenges for the adjudicating
tribunal, forcing it to indulge in factual determinations of de facto
elements of command responsibility, as seen above. The latter,
civilian leaders outside the military, often commanding non-
traditional, non-state organizations, such as political parties, civilian
militias (Interahamwe), or terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda,
represent a greater challenge.
Any standard of superior responsibility based solely on de jure
considerations is likely to fail in circumstances such as Rwanda or
Yugoslavia. The Rome Statute of the ICC explicitly recognizes the
need for a flexible doctrine of superior responsibility, and one that
recognizes de facto commanders, whether military or purely civilian,
based on "effective control."10 The move towards a de facto standard
for superior responsibility, however, also removes its moorings in de
jure military command structures. For example, the current detention
of suspected Taliban and Al-Qaeda members, and their designation as
"unlawful combatants," forces the question whether they are
protected under the Geneva Convention, and can consequently also
be judged based on the standards applied to combatants.
Thus, practicability, given the grievousness of crimes against
humanity, and the evidentiary burden particular to commanders
rather than the actual perpetrators, has been an important underlying
justification for superior responsibility. According to one delegate to
the drafting of Protocol I, superior responsibility is, thus a
"convenient mechanism for apportioning responsibility.""0 7 Superior
responsibility for civilians has a practicability benefit, as it effectuates
the goals of superior responsibility in cases where the evidentiary
burden may be more difficult due to the lack of traditional military
contexts. Balancing the rights of the accused and the need for
accountability, however, ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence and the
Rome Statute, apply a more stringent test when applying the doctrine
106. See generally, The Rome Statute for an International Criminal Court, supra
note 51.
107. Lippman, supra note 17, at 90.
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to de facto civilian superiors, given the absence of de jure authority
though the evidentiary challenges are greater.
V. Critiques of Superior Responsibility for Civilians without de
jure authority
The extension of superior responsibility to civilian superiors,
both de jure and de facto has not been uncontroversial." The
criticism springs primarily from the doctrine's foundations in de jure
military command structures.10
For instance, Alexander Zahar, formerly with the ICTR and now
with the ICTY, makes valid arguments for limiting superior
responsibility to military de jure superiors.1 ' For Zahar, a superior-
subordinate relationship is limited to "the appearance of a formal
relationship of authority (even if it is not formally constituted), and it
must subsist within a goal-directed hierarchical organization or
institution (even if it is ad hoc or transitory)."'.. This definition would
exclude, for example, the Interahamwe leaders in Rwanda,' 2 ill
serving the need for international law to provide a remedy to serious
jus cogens violations.
For the actus reus element, Zahar distinguishes the omission of
action from "obedience achieved through bullying, or by submission
to an intimidating and morally delinquent individual. 11 3  For the
latter, grounding himself in formal military structures, he maintains
that "[tihere must be a known power in the superior to control and
discipline the criminal behavior of subordinates in meaningful and
effective ways, such as by intervening to restrain or subordinate or by
directly suspending his or her services to the unit, at least until such
time as the matter can be reviewed by another (higher) authority. '1 .
Zahar further argues that "[a]lthough the degree of control wielded
by de jure or de facto superior[s] may take different forms, a de facto
108. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber
Judgement, (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Sept. 2, 1998), at point 491
("[T]he application of the principles of individual criminal responsibility, enshrined in
Article 6(3), to civilians remains contentious.") (emphasis added).
109. See generally Alexander Zahar, Command Responsibility of Civilian
Superiors for Genocide, 14 L.J.I.L. 591 (2001).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 609.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 609-10.
114. Id. at 610.
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superior must be found to wield substantially similar powers of
control over subordinates to be held criminally responsible for their
acts.""5 As such, he concludes that the convictions of Kayishema"6
and Musema are "deeply flawed."".7  For Zahar, Musema is
illustrative of the weakness of extending jurisprudence arising from
de jure military hierarchies to de facto civilian superiors. Musema's
relationship with his employees was not consistent with the accepted
general jurisprudence on superior-subordinate relationships. Indeed,
the ICTR Trial Chamber relied, inter alia, on the Tokyo Tribunal's
dubious conviction of General Akiro Muto, the Chief of Staff of
General Yamashita, for the "Rape of Nanking" though he had no
operational subordinates. "8 Musema extends the doctrine of superior
responsibility even further than General Muto's trial, applying it to a
factory owner with limited de jure authority over his employees. 19
Superior responsibility for de facto civilian leaders is also
criticized for not being supported by the "justice and efficiency
considerations, which stem from the special relations between
superiors and subordinates who operate within a structured military
organization . ,,.20 Even in traditional superior responsibility
jurisprudence, as mentioned above, superior responsibility has never
rested solely on de jure considerations, except, as explained above, in
cases such as In re Yamashita, as explored above.
Another critic of superior responsibility - Damaska - has with
good cause criticized the ad-hoc tribunals for an "uncritical"
acceptance as binding precedent of the Post-World War II
jurisprudence despite its flaws, some of which have been outlined
above in this paper.12 ' For Damaska, the tribunals "stop deferentially
115. Id. at 613.
116. Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-I, Trial Chamber Judgment,
points 501, 508 (Int'l Crim. Trib for Rwanda 2000), available at <www.ictr.org>
("Kayishema was often identified transporting or leading many of the assailants to
the massacre sites. He was regularly identified, for example, in the company of
members of the Interahamwe - transporting them, instructing them, rewarding them,
as well as directing and leading their attacks. The Trial Chamber, therefore is
satisfied that Kayishema had strong affiliations with these assailants, and his
command over them at each massacre site, as with other assailants, was clearly
established by witness testimony.").
117. Id. at 616.
118. Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICFR-96-13-T, Trial Chamber Judgement,
57, 880 (Int'l Crim. Trib for Rwanda 2000), at point 139.
119. Id. at point 140.
120. Shany & Michaeli, supra note 53, at 836.
121. Damaska, supra note 19, at 489.
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before each decision as if it were a station in a pilgrimage, and treat
each rule discerned in the decision as if it were unarguable as a papal
bull. 1 22  The ad-hoc tribunals' seamless use of fifty-year-old
jurisprudence and its application to apposite facts gives some
credence to Damaska's critique.
Neither Zahar's, Damaska's, nor other critiques of superior
responsibility for civilian de facto leaders, however, address the
necessity of holding the true perpetrators of jus cogens violators
accountable in international law. Faced with post-modern conflicts,
tribunals have struggled with applying superior responsibility to de
facto civilian leaders, with resulting inconsistencies. This may be
partly explained by the contradictions between the need for superior
responsibility to solve evidentiary problems in holding jus cogens
directly responsible for their own actions and the higher threshold for
civilian superior responsibility. The haze of conflict and the nature of
jus cogens violations do not always produce evidence that satisfies the
strict standard for de facto civilian superiors. If such a showing is
possible, the offenses may be chargeable directly as aiding and
abetting. However, mostly, it is not, and moreover, direct liability
does not enhance penalties for "armchair" jus cogens violators, the
very people it is most necessary to hold accountable. Thus, military
genealogy has provided a useful tool to hold accountable de facto
civilian superiors, but ultimately one that is flawed and limited in its
effectiveness. To use Damaska's paraphrase of Clemenceau's dictum,
"military justice relates to its civilian cousin as a brass band does to a
symphonic orchestra.
1 23
VI. Another look back at Nuremberg
The deference to the post World War II tribunals in modern
international criminal law on superior responsibility has not extended
to the criminal organizations provisions adopted for the Nuremberg
trial. Under the plain meaning of the Articles of the International
Military Tribunal (IMT) and the Allied Control Council Law, mere
membership in a criminal organization, defined as one guilty of a
substantive crime, was sufficient without re-litigation or predicate acts
for criminal punishment, including the death penalty. 2' Derivate of
122. Id.
123. Id. at 496.
124. Article 6 of the Charter of the IMT states that the Tribunal could try persons
"as individuals or as members of organizations." Article 9 declares that an
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unlikely sources' 5 in Anglo-American common law, it was almost
without precedence for French and Soviet legal systems, except for
laws against agencies or organizations dangerous to the state.
As with the doctrine of superior responsibility, expediency seems
to have been an important factor in the Charter's provisions on
criminal organizations. The lack of a need to re-litigate theoretically
allowed for speedier trials. J rg Freidrich argues that declaring
organization criminal, affecting one million members, was an Allied
tool for control through "denazification."' 26
In the final analysis, however, the provisions against criminal
organizations were of little import in the Nuremberg trials. First, the
Tribunal recognized that "mass punishment should be avoided" and
the law on criminal organization was a "far reaching and novel
procedure" that "unless properly safeguarded, may produce great
injustice.' '127 Declaring criminal organization analogous to criminal
conspiracies, the court limited culpability to voluntary members who
had knowledge of the organization's criminal object or were
themselves implicated in the commission of a crime. Second, the
Prosecutor, exercising his discretion, excluded lower level members of
the Leadership Corp of the Nazi party.29
Third, the General Staff of the German Military High Command
organization could be declared a "criminal organization" with the possibility of its
memberships defending these charges against the organization. Article 10 states in
whole that:
[i]n cases where a group or organization is declared criminal by the
Tribunal, the competent national authority of any Signatory will have the
right to bring individuals to trial for membership therein before national,
military or occupation courts. In any case the criminal nature of the group or
organization is considered proved and shall not be questioned.
Allied Control Council Law No. 10 also stipulates membership to be sufficient for
punishment, including the death sentence. Charter of the International Military
Tribunal, at www.yale.edullawweb/avalonlproc/oric/imtconst.htm; EUGENE
DAVIDSON, TRIAL OF THE GERMANS, 556 (1997); The Nuremberg Trial 1946, 6 F.R.D.
69 (1946-1947).
125. Judge Jackson cited laws designed to punish the racist Klu Klux Klan, while
the British cited the special laws to suppress "thuggies" (armed bandits) in India and
pirate ships that imposed criminal liabilities even on ship cooks. DAVIDSON, supra
note 124 at 16.
126. PETER MAGUIRE, A Cold War Conflict of Interest, in WAR CRIMES, supra
note 19, at 89.
127. The Nuremberg Trial 1946, 6 F.R.D. at 192-93.
128. Id. at 194; Ruti Teitel, Nuremberg and its Legacy, in WAR CRIMES, supra note
19 at 48.
129. The Nuremberg Trial 1946, 6 F.R.D. at 207.
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and the German Cabinet were held not to be criminal organizations,
the former because there was no voluntary membership of a group
that did not exist, and the latter because it did not function as an
effective organization after 1937, and its few members could be tried
in individual cases. 3 The SA (Nazi militia) was not a criminal
organization as they were not guilty of the substantive crime of
waging aggressive war, though they committed atrocities as they had
been sidelined before the war started.
1 31
Fourth, The Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the Security
Police (Gestapo and SD), and the SS were all held to be criminal
organizations, but with little consequence.'32 The Leadership Corps of
the Nazi Party, for instance, was guilty of a campaign of
"Germanization" in the occupied countries, the persecution of Jews,
the administration of slave labor programs, and the mistreatment of
Prisoners of War and Allied airmen.'33 In the convictions of
Bormann, a member of the SS and a Nazi; Von Neurath, an
Obergruppenfuehrer in the SS as well as a Cabinet Minister; Frick, an
official and Chief Nazi Administrator, for instance, no reference was
made to their membership in any of the criminal organizations, even
though some were partly acquitted on certain charges.'9 Sauckel, a
Nazi official who was an Obergruppenfuehrer with both the SA and
the SS, was not guilty of Count 1 and 2, though he was guilty of
Counts 3 and 4.135 Similarly, Fritzsche, a Naxi propagandist and party
member, was acquitted of all charges without reference to his Nazi
membership. 136
The International Military Tribunal was justifiably reluctant to
find culpability based solely on membership, even with the additional
mens rea requirement of voluntary association and knowledge of
criminal objective. This reluctance may have led to the oversight of
later drafters of international criminal law towards the concept of
criminal organization. The drafters of the Nuremberg Charter,
however, though their hammer was overly large, were not entirely
mistaken in their approach. Criminal organizations, with the
130. Id. at 240-41.
131. Id. at 237.
132. Id. at 206, 221, 233.
133. Id. at 199-205.
134. Id. at 366-69, 290.
135. Id. at 337-41.
136. Id. at 373-77.
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appropriate safeguards, and additional requirements of culpability,
remain a building block of effective and proportionate prosecution of
non de jure civilian leaders.
VII. National Legislation
National penal legislation, tackling issues such as organized
crime and terrorist activities have adopted a slightly different
approach to holding civilian criminal leaders, and their leaders
accountable. As a comparative exercise, this note looks at two
national penal legislations, as possible models for a new paradigm for
a superior responsibility doctrine for civilian de facto leaders.
(1) RICO
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization ("RICO")
legislation, passed in 1970, is a chapter of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, and states, inter alia, in subsection 18 U.S.C.
1962 (c), that:
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with
any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly
or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
1
1
7
RICO targets an organization, either criminal or controlled by
criminals, specifically the "organized criminal behavior and the
involvement of its leaders in directing that behavior ....
Like superior responsibility, RICO is a child of expediency; the
perceived need to tackle organized crime, and the inadequacy of
existing laws and criminal doctrines in tackling organized crime.
Without RICO, organized criminal groups were only targeted
through individual members, who were invariably able to shield
themselves and the organization from full accountability.139  The
Congressional Record of 1970 explicitly recognizes organized crime
and the:
defects in the evidence gathering process of the law [that] inhibit[]
the development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to
137. 18 U.S.C.A § 1962 (Westlaw, 2003).
138. G. Robert Blakey, Law and the Continuing Enterprise: Perspectives on RICO,
65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 873,880-81 (1990).
139. Id.
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bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies on the unlawful
activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the
sanctions and remedies available to the Government are
unnecessarily limited in scope and impact.
40
For Congress, the ability of criminal organizations and leaders to
circumvent existing laws was a prime motivating factor in legislating
RICO. 4'
Individuals must direct or participate in the criminal group to
incur RICO liability. In Reves v. Ernst & Young, the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that to incur RICO liability under § 1962 (c), the
individuals must have some degree of participation "in the operation
or management of the enterprise[.]' ' 142 Also, The predicate offenses
required by § 1962 must be committed by "virtue of [one's] position"
in the organization or "related to the activities of the enterprise.'
143
The role of the participation, however, cannot be minimal." For
instance, in U.S. v. Masotto, an associate of the "Gambino crime
family" who ran a "mafia" group was convicted because he was not
merely related to the activities of the criminal enterprise, but
participated in the operation or management of the enterprise. 141 In
this collective responsibility prompted by individuals' predicate acts,
suppliers, such as accountants, are not liable, as a "person must
knowingly engage in directing the enterprises' affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity.'
14 6
(2) POTA (TADA)
The Indian Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), and its
predecessor, the Terrorism and Anti-Disruptive Act (TADA),
although correctly characterized as draconian legislation for inter alia,
allowing police confessions and pre-trial detention, and repealed by
the new government in 2004, also look at terrorist crimes through the
organizational prism.'4 7 In doing so, they are representational of
special anti-terrorism statutes enacted across the world. POTA,
140. Congressional statement, Oct. 15, 1970, P.L. 91 - 452.
141. 115 CONG. REC. 56 (1969).
142. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 183 (1993).
143. U.S. v. Wong, 40 F.3d 1347, 1372 (2d Cir. 1994).
144. Id.
145. U.S. v. Masotto, 73 F.3d 1233, 1238 (2d Cir. 1996).
146. Univ. of Md. v. Peat, Marwick, Main & Co., 996 F.2d. 1534, 1539 (3d Cir.
1993).
147. Down the Black Hole. HINDUSTAN TIMES, Dec. 10, 2004.
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enacted only in 2002 and with scant jurisprudence to date, was
essentially a little changed update of TADA. Article 3(5) of POTA
states:
Any person who is a member of a terrorist gang or a terrorist
organization which is involved in terrorist acts, shall be punishable
(sic) with imprisonment for a term which may extend to
imprisonment for life, or with fine which may extend to rupees ten
lack, or with both.
The Act elaborates in Article 3(20)(1) that "A person commits
an offense if he or she belongs to a terrorist organization.,
14 9
(3) Implications for Superior Responsibility
National legislation on criminal or terrorist organizations can
potentially contribute to the international customary law doctrine of
superior responsibility for de facto civilian superiors, particularly
RICO. Racketeering organizations, such as the Mafia, share many
characteristics to the nebulous organizations, such as the
Interahamwe, that are often perpetrators of international crimes and
jus cogens violations. Yet, the doctrine of superior responsibility,
derivative of military command responsibility, does not address the
criminality of organizations themselves. Currently, the Interahamwe,
for example, cannot be charged with being a criminal organization,
with derivative liability for those who participated, through
management or operation, in its conduct. However, as the Prosecutor
in Akayesu, Pierre-Richard Prosper explained, the Interahamwe are
similar to the "ethnically based street gangs he had prosecuted in Los
Angeles. ' ' 0 According to Prosper:
In gangs, [such as the Interahamwe,] it is more criminal minded.
They live in a criminal world. Ties of blood and ethnicity are huge.
It's a family. People will go to any extreme to protect their turf and
their reputation ... [Akayesu is] like a businessman with two faces,
an opportunist who joined a criminal enterprise. He's doing
business in an environment where part of doing business is killing
people. It was a cold calculated political decision. He thought he
was joining the winning side. It was all about power... smart
people taking advantage of a criminal environment.
148. BARE Acr, The Prevention of Terrorism Act 6 (2002).
149. Id.
150. BERKELEY, supra note 97,262.
151. Id.
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RICO-like legislation would have allowed focus on the criminal
enterprise, the Interahamwe, through evidence that the "various
associates function as a continuing unit.' '1 2 Targeting perpetrators'
organizations directly may help the efficacy and speed of justice,
holding culpable individuals who participated in the organization's
fulfilling of a common purpose, without explicitly showing a de facto
superior relationship. Thus, the prosecution of an Interahamwe
member, charged with superior responsibility based on RICO, may
only need to prove either that the offense related to the activities of
the enterprise, or the member was able to "commit the offense solely
because of his position in the enterprise."'53 In U.S. v. Amato for
instance, the defendant directed action intimidating a potential
informant, incurring RICO liabilities. "4
There already exist linkages connecting the dots between penal
laws focused on the criminal organization, and superior responsibility.
As seen above, organizations were charged as organizations at
Nuremberg. Also, in a resolution of the 1999 Association
Internationale de Droit P~nal (AIDP) Congress, in stressing the
importance of holding "men in the background" accountable, stated
that:
Because it is often difficult to prove that leaders and members of
organized criminal groups have actively participated in the
perpetration of particular offenses, traditional forms of
perpetration and accessorial liability can be insufficient to make
these individuals accountable. To the extent the traditional law of
perpetratorship and complicity is deemed insufficient, one should
consider a cautious modernization based on the principle of
organizational responsibility. In hierarchically structured
organizations, persons with decision and control power can be
made responsible for acts of other members under their control if
they have ordered those acts to be committed or have consciously
omitted to prevent their commission."5 (Emphasis added.)
Also, the Rome Statute drafters, according to one author,
considered the "importance of the so-called doctrine of domination
by virtue of organizational control (Organisationsherrschaftslehre)
with regard to the criminal attribution of positive acts within a
152. U.S. v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,583 (1981).
153. U.S. v. Amato, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 851 *5 (2d Cir. 2004)
154. Id.
155. Resolution IM. of § I of the XVI AIDP Congress 1999 in Budapest,
reproduced in Ambos supra note 7, at 846.
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criminal organization.""' 6
National legislation influencing international customary law has
not only been a unidirectional exchange. Article 12 of the proposed
European Corpus Juris states:
(1) If one of the offenses.., is committed for the benefit of a
business by someone acting under the authority of another person
who is the head of the businesses, or who controls it or exercises the
power to make decisions within it, that other person is also
criminally liable if he knowingly allowed the offense to be
committed.57
The proposed European penal code suggests that superior
responsibility is also being considered for national legislation.
Crimes of association do not fit in the traditional categories of
primary and secondary liability. Nevertheless, laws such as RICO
and POTA are legal responses to societal problems, in RICO's case,
organized criminal organizations. They offer a body of jurisprudence
that should be considered in the development of superior
responsibility for civilians, in and of itself, a legal response to jus
cogens violations in post-modern conflicts.
RICO has, however, been severely criticized in the United
States. In criminalizing association with a racketeering organization,
for one commentator, it infringes "[t]he most natural privilege of
man[.]"" 8 At least in principle, the U.S. Supreme Court held that civil
liability could not constitutionally be imposed because a boycott led
by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) had resulted in violence, absent evidence that the leaders
specifically intended the violence. 9 The Court stated that "guilt by
association is a philosophy alien to the tradition of a free
society .... "160
RICO, like superior responsibility, in expounding a "compound
model of liability" also allows the prosecution to add multiple
offenses for the same evidence, and exponentially add to the
complexity of criminal trials.16 In the words of one seasoned defense
156. Ambos, supra note 7, at 854.
157. Ambos, supra note 7, at 844 (emphasis added).
158. David Cole, Hanging with the Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorists, and the
Right of Association, 1999 SuP. CT. REv. 203,230.
159. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 931-32 (1982).
160. Id.
161. Susan W. Brenner, RICO, CCE, and other Complex Crimes: The
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attorney:
Thirty years ago I began my practice trying prostitution cases...
Recently, I am engaged in a multi-defendant, multi-count RICO
conspiracy trial.. .in which the bulk of the indictment consists of 30-
some prostitution counts, all under the umbrella of a RICO
conspiracy. What would have been an hour or two trial in the state
court is now a month or more federal prosecution .... All to what
end?
162
A superior responsibility derived from RICO-like legislation
must remain mindful of its potential to infringe a universal right to
association, and restrict its application to only the most serious of jus
cogens violations that demand justice, with strict mens rea
requirements, even in the absence of specific proof of involvement for
culpable superiors of culpable organizations.
VIII. Conclusion
Superior responsibility was a legal response to the needs of
accountability for superiors operating in explicit military command
structures, and was consequently grounded in de jure foundations for
its elements. As conflicts have evolved, and actors and their
organizations have become more nebulous, superior responsibility
has also evolved, implicitly and explicitly, to extend accountability to
non de jure civilian superiors. In doing so, courts have applied
different variations of mens rea and actus reus requirements. The
record, particularly of the ad-hoc tribunals, reflects the
inconsistencies inherent in that extension.
Laws, even in their contexts, are often flawed, and RICO and
POTA are susceptible to valid criticism. However, they are legal
responses to societal problems, and international customary law must
similarly respond to the heinous and serious jus cogens violations that
often accompany modern conflicts. As jurisprudence that lends
weight to the evolution of superior responsibility for non-state civilian
actors acting without de jure authority - the plain language and
jurisprudence of RICO and POTA are a valuable paradigm and
resource for national and international law.
Transformation of American Criminal Law, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 239, 241
(1993).
162. Id.
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